Background:
Three or four weeks ago, Exbeliever and I started a discussion about Christianity and atheism. Due to other events in my life, I’ve had to postpone my response for sometime, but now I’m able to offer a statement of my position as a Christian.
What I’ve written is a statement of my position as a presuppositionalist and a Christian. I’ve endeavored to define a fair burden of proof for each side in this discussion, to present challenges to the atheist worldview, and to support my own presuppositions. As I’m continually seeking to refine my approach, I welcome any and all comments, but only if they meet these standards. I will delete comments that are not respectful, that contain ad hominem attacks, or that in any other way violate the commenting policy.
Also, I’m leaving for another week on Sunday (the 18th). For the rest of June I’ll be in and out of town, with limited Internet access, so I’ll probably be a while responding to any comments.
One more thing – I know this post is really, really long. Still, I think it’s worth reading, though perhaps not in one sitting. Since I won’t be posting for a while, you’ll have plenty of time to evaluate. I covet your thoughts, critiques, and suggestions!
The Nature of Proof
Exbeliever, you want me to provide you with a deductive proof for the existence of God, something that ends with the statement, “Therefore, God exists.” I’ll be upfront – I’m not going to do that. Before you throw up your hands in disgust, read my reasons for declining to do so.
- You can’t prove a presupposition. For clarity, I’d like to define the word presupposition. Philosopher Ronald Nash writes that presuppositions are “beliefs that we accept without support from arguments or evidence.” They’re assumptions, in other words. By definition, they can’t be proven. Here, I use the word “proof” to mean a deductive, logical argument. I think that’s the sense in which you have been using the word, as well.
- Belief or non-belief in God is a presuppositional choice. I don’t believe there is a deductive proof for God’s existence. On that issue, it appears that we agree. I don’t believe in God because of such a proof. Rather, I assume that he exists. Now, some Christians would disagree with this statement, but I’m not defending the idea of apologetics that some Christians hold; I’m defending the idea of apologetics that I believe is biblical. This is fair, in light of our previous discussion regarding your definition of atheism.
It follows from these statements that you can’t prove God’s existence or non-existence. Again, I’m pretty sure we both agree on this.
However, here’s where I think we disagree: you say that since we can’t (deductively) prove God’s existence, we should assume he doesn’t exist. Of course, some atheists, like yourself, are still open to the possibility that God exists. My position is that it is irresponsible to assume, by default, that God does not exist, simply because there is no deductive proof for his existence. Here s why:
- Everyone operates on the basis of presuppositions and has a worldview. Really quickly, let me present another definition. This is from James Nickel (a mathematician, educator, theologian, and writer). According to Nickel, a worldview is “a network of presuppositions not authenticated by the procedures of natural science, a perspective through which everything in human experience is interpreted and human reason is guided.” We all have unprovable assumptions. For example, I sincerely hope we both believe that other people have minds, yet this is not a provable statement. We can’t prove logical laws or geometric axioms, either. Our worldviews are composed of these presuppositions and other core beliefs.
- Atheism isn’t provable. Atheism, or naturalism (by which I mean the opposite of supernaturalism), is, like all other worldviews, composed of presuppositions. By definition, it’s unprovable. Both theists and atheists have common presuppositions, like the ones I mentioned above. Atheism also has presuppositions that it does not share with most theists, such as the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system. Please note – I am not trying to put words in your mouth. I don’t know all of your presuppositions, and I am, to an extent, generalizing what I know about atheism/naturalism. If I misrepresent your worldview, please correct me.
- The conflict is between ultimately unprovable worldviews. If you can’t prove your presuppositions and I can’t prove mine, it’s unreasonable for you to reject my presuppositions in favor of yours, as long as you are basing your decision on my failure to offer a deductive proof. You can’t offer a deductive proof for your position, either. Clearly, there is a conflict. Just as clearly, we can’t use deductive proofs to resolve the conflict because it occurs at a presuppositional level.
Now, what criterion can we use to evaluate the worldviews in question, since deductive proof is not viable? I present the criterion of explanatory power. My position is that Christianity’s presuppositions can explain human observations and that no other worldview can. The choice is between Christianity and inconsistency.
Exbeliever, when I alluded to this criterion earlier in our discussion, you responded that a worldview’s inability to answer a fundamental question is no reason to reject that worldview because some future discovery might provide an answer. Basically, the possibility of greater explanatory power in the future outweighs inability to provide answers in the present. You also said that an individual’s inability to justify his worldview doesn’t mean the worldview itself is unsound, only that the individual can’t defend it.
My response is that this answer invalidates our present discussion. If we allow for this, then we have created a giant cop-out. Anytime I am unable to provide an answer to a fundamental question, I can trust that the future will justify me. You can do the same. It’s conceivable that we would both end up clinging to our worldviews out of blind faith in the future. This has the potential to render our discussion meaningless.
As I say this, I do want to clarify and qualify. I don’t have to give provide a specific process in answer to any specific question you may ask, and neither do you. I can’t tell you the specific method God used to create the world. You can’t tell me the specific method by which evolution happened. When I speak of providing answers, this is not what I mean. What I do mean is that each worldview has to provide answers that are (1) logically consistent, and (2) reasonable.
With that said, let me clarify what I mean by presenting the criterion of explanatory power. A worldview with explanatory power meets the two conditions above. It is logically consistent – it has no internal contradictions – and it is reasonable, or consistent with our observation of the world.
Ken Ham offers an analogy in support of the explanatory power criterion. Presuppositions are like glasses. We put them on and they determine how we view the world. The question is, which set of glasses is consistent with the evidence?
To summarize: our present discussion must be one that compares two worldviews. We cannot rely on deductive proofs. A criterion by which we can accurately evaluate our worldviews is that of explanatory power. My contention is that Christianity is the only worldview with sufficient explanatory power, and thus, it is superior to all others. While there are many ways to demonstrate Christianity’s superior explanatory power, I am going to look specifically at metaphysics and ethics.
Considering the Options
On a basic philosophical level, all worldviews ultimately come down to one of four options. Below is a quick summary (taken from Francis Schaeffer’s He Is There and He Is Not Silent).
- There is no rational explanation for it all. I’m not going to concentrate on this for two reasons. First, to the best of my knowledge, neither you nor I believe it. Second, it’s self-defeating since it uses logic to come to its conclusion.
- The cosmos comes from nothing. Again, I don’t think either of us holds this position, so I’m not going to spend time on it. Also, I’d contend that no one holds this position at all because there’s no support for it; namely, it’s inconsistent with everything we observe. As Julie Andrews sings In The Sound of Music, “Nothing comes from nothing/Nothing ever could.”
- The cosmos had an impersonal beginning. This option includes all pantheistic philosophies, as well as atheism a la Carl Sagan. “The cosmos is all there ever was or ever will be.” I’m assuming this is your position, but please correct me if I’m wrong. I’ll address this explanatory power of this option later.
- The cosmos had a personal beginning. This is my preferred option. I narrow it to the infinite-personal God of Christianity, but more on that later.
Those are the options. Hopefully we can agree that the last two are the only ones we need to discuss. If not, let me know and I’ll change my assumptions in this area.
The Metaphysical Challenge
Here we’re dealing with the study of being. I’m going to look specifically at the nature of man. My contention is this: to explain the existence of personality, the Christian worldview is necessary.
Throughout history, humans have observed that they are different from any other organism in the universe. Unlike all animals and other life forms, humans appear to possess personality. This is what we have observed. Now we have to ask which set of presuppositions, or glasses, best explains this observation.
The presupposition that the cosmos had an impersonal beginning tries to explain human personality in one of two ways. First, it may claim that the personal arose from the impersonal. This, however, cannot be true. We have absolutely no reason so accept this idea. It’s totally unfounded, and nothing in our human experience attests to this being possible. Rather, all our experience dictates that only personality can create personality. If we accept an impersonal beginning, however, we have to reduce personality to impersonality + time. The only difference between us and other life forms is time, which allowed complexity to develop.
This interpretation has two fundamental problems. First, according to everything we’ve ever observed, it’s impossible for the impersonal to create the personal. Second, this approach comes perilously close to denying personality by reducing it to impersonal + time/complexity.
If we still want to believe in an impersonal source, but we don’t want to back ourselves in to a corner by saying the personal came from the impersonal, there is another option open to us. We could deny that man is a personal being. Yet, this approach is seriously flawed, as well. The first problem is that this interpretation is inconsistent with the whole of human experience. The second problem is that this interpretation forces us into determinism. This would mean that all our actions are pre-determined by chance, random, impersonal forces. We, and all our seeming “personality” are only the effects of previous chemical causes, which were themselves merely effects. When we take this approach and deny personality, we deny the “mannishness” of man. We deny ourselves.
Both of these interpretations fail to meet the criterion of interpretive power. The claim that the personal came from the impersonal is not reasonable (condition #2) because it denies human experience. I would claim that it fails the first condition of logical consistency because there’s not even a shred of evidence of support the idea. This interpretation is the equivalent of saying “As far as we know, personality can’t spring from non-personality, but we still say that it does.” The claim that there is no personality also fails condition #2 because it also denies the entirety of human experience and observation.
A personal beginning, by contrast, can easily account for personality: a personal God created personality. To expand on this idea further, the Christian God is also infinite, which gives finite man an infinite reference point, a sufficient integration point for his existence. Metaphysically, a personal beginning meets the criterion of explanatory power, unlike an impersonal beginning.
The Ethical Challenge
A worldview with sufficient explanatory power must also be able to provide consistent, convincing answers in the area of ethics, or morality. As I look at ethics, my contention is that without a personal God, there is no logical basis for morality. Yet denying morality flies in the face of human experience. If we presuppose an impersonal beginning, we must deny either logic or human experience in the area of ethics. In either case, an impersonal beginning fails to meet the standard of explanatory power.
Ethics are inescapably personal. There is no right or wrong in the impersonal world, only time, chance, and chemical processes. Unless we can have a personal basis, we cannot have ethics. If we try to find our personal basis in mankind, we relegate all of ethics to matters of opinion. Ethics that spring from human experience alone, rather than from a personal God, are not really ethics; they’re just preferences. Right and wrong must have their source outside of mankind. If we try to find our personal basis in an impersonal beginning, we’re thrust into a metaphysical quandary. The bottom line is, ethics have to come from a personal source, and the only sufficient source is a personal God.
Recognizing this, many atheists have tried to deny ethics, but this position, as I’ve mentioned, contradicts human experience. It rubs our sensibilities in the mud. It forces us to admit that torture is not a moral issue. This was the Marquis de Sade’s argument, and Alexander Pope’s claim: “Whatever is, is right!” Ravi Zacharias says we’re left with nothing but humans “dancing to their DNA.” Determinism and impersonality destroys ethics.
“Is this what we have come to? We must be warned that there are no brakes on this slippery slope once we step onto it. The denial of an objective moral law, based on the compulsion to deny the existence of God, results ultimately in the denial of evil itself. Can you imagine telling a raped woman that the rapist merely danced to his DNA? …Tell the victims of Auschwitz that their tormentors merely danced to their DNA. Tell the loved ones of those cannibalized by Jeffrey Dahmer that he merely danced to his DNA. So dance along! How repugnant! This is not a dance!” (Jesus Among Other Gods, Ravi Zacharias)
In the area of ethics, meeting the standard of explanatory power requires a personal beginning.
More on Ethics
Exbeliever, on one of your posts about presuppositionalism, I read your argument that morals can be both relative and objective simultaneously. You presented this argument as a refutation of the idea that morality must be universal. I’m thinking this would be a good time to respond to your argument so you won’t have to make it all over again.
Basically, you said that just as motion is both relative and objective, morality can also be simultaneously relative and objective. You argued that morality can still be morality, even if it only exists in the context of a framework arbitrarily created by human beings. You noted that society’s conception of morality depends on which groups exert the most social or political influence.
Here’s my response:
This argument rests on equivocation. By the end of the argument, morality means something entirely different than it did at the beginning. At the end, morality may be objective, but it’s also nothing more than personal opinion. That fact that my favorite color is purple is also objective, but it’s still personal opinion. If I understand you correctly, morality is no more authoritative than my favorite color or your favorite food. Objective it may be, but it’s also merely opinion. Whoever most successfully foists his opinion on society gets to define morality.
You can say you “believe that it is morally wrong to rape someone,” but not that it is morally wrong to rape someone. There is a huge difference between belief and actuality. Just because you believe something doesn’t make it so. You can believe something, and you can try to impose your belief on others (by fair means or foul), but it’s still a personal opinion. You may have an objective moral framework, but where did the framework originate? Why should we accept it? Because you say so? Again, this isn’t morality anymore; it’s merely opinion.
This is not at all what I (or Greg Bahnsen) mean when we discuss morality. By “morality” we mean something greater than personal opinion, something binding. Our argument is that this concept of morality can only spring from an infinite-personal source.
That’s All, Folks
OK – I’m winding down now. To consolidate matters, here’s the issue in brief: when dealing with two un-provable worldview systems, we must use the criterion of explanatory power to evaluate the systems’ merit. Systems that presuppose an impersonal beginning fail to meet this criterion on the metaphysical and ethical levels. The Christian system, that of an infinite-personal God, does meet this standard. Because of this, I hold that it is reasonable to accept it.
As Schaeffer wrote, “Christianity is not the best answer. It is the only answer.” It’s the only answer that is logically consistent and reasonable, meaning it’s consistent with human experience. The “glasses” of the Christian worldview are the only glasses that enable us to see the world clearly and truly.
19 comments:
Karen,
I appreciate your thoughtful post.
In the message you sent me telling me about this post, you wrote, "There's a good chance you'll view what I've written as an attempt to avoid offering an argument for the existence of God. Please understand that it is not at all my intention to avoid argument. However, I am a presuppositionalist, and I do argue like one."
I must point out, though, that presuppositionalists do use a deductive argument for the existence of God. It was developed by Van Til and used by Bahnsen, Frame, and all others that I know about who claim to be presuppositionalists. This argument is the transcendental argument for the existence of god (TAG).
In his debate with Gordon Stein, Greg Bahnsen wrote, "When we go to look at the different world views that atheists and theists have, I suggest we can prove the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary. The transcendental proof for God's existence is that without Him it is impossible to prove anything. The atheist world view is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist world view
cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist world view cannot account for our debate tonight."
While not explicitly stated or spelled out, this is a deductive argument meant to prove God's existence. Bahnsen states this explicitly--". . . we can prove the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary."
I did a little searching and it looks like you also have supported this argument in the very recent past. On this blog, you wrote, "What we are saying is that by reasoning from the impossibility of the contrary, we can demonstrate Christianity’s truth."
This "impossibility of the contrary" argument is interesting to me and a little different from a transcendental argument. It sounds as if you and Bahnsen are saying,
P1: Either the Christian worldview is true or another worldview is true.
P2: It is not the case that another other worldview is true
C: Therefore, the Christian worldview is true.
There are obviously problems with this. First, there are people who call themselves Christians who deny that it is the case only Christianity can be true. You probably would say that these aren't "real" Christians, but that is an inside battle and, therefore, not one for me (an outsider) to decide. Can you speak for all Christians when you say the Christian worldview is exclusive? Is there some kind of argument that you can make to me, a non-Christian, that would convince me that your exclusivity claim is true and the others' inclusivity claim is false?
But even if I concede the first premise of this argument, it is still up to the Christian to support the second premise. How do you support the assertion that "It is not the case that another other worldview is true"?
The way I have seen presuppositionalists attempt to support this on the internet (and the reason that I was so insistent on refusing to answer your questions about morality) is to simply ask an epistemological or meta-ethical questions that they believe the non-Christian cannot answer in that worldview. A lengthy epistemological or meta-ethical debate ensues and one wonders how a god plays into the conversation at all.
What these presuppositionalists are trying to do is to prove that another worldview is not true by pointing out that that particular person cannot explain the existence of something vital to her worldview within that worldview. But they are not being forthcoming about how this fits into any argument about a god or gods.
The "impossibility of the contrary" argument, though, is not TAG per se. TAG is a little different. It starts with the belief that the Christian god is a precondition for laws of logic or universal morality. I think this is what you meant when, on the previously cited blog, you stated, "Looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge."
The transcendental argument can be formulated:
P1: A is a precondition of B.
P2: B exists (or is possible).
C: Therefore, A exists.
To put it in a presuppositionalist context:
P1: The Christian God is a precondition of universal moral standards.
P2: Universal moral standards exist.
C: Therefore, the Christian God exists.
A more traditional way, still, to formulate this is:
P1: If universal moral standards exist, then the Christian God exists.
P2: Universal moral standards exist.
C: Therefore, the Christian God exists.
Either way, this is the argument underlying all of the questions that you ask about an atheist's standards of morality or her account for universal laws of logic.
This is why I said that your question about my standards of morality and laws of logic are not sincere. You already believe that "A naturalist can’t account for the laws of logic in his worldview – he can’t defend it philosophically" (same website cited above). You already have a belief about my ability to answer your question. You believe that the Christian worldview alone can "account" for these things.
My challenge to you, Karen, is to boldly defend your argument. These are your assertions and, as such, you should support them. You say:
We actually can prove that Christianity is the only philosophically defensible belief system.
. . . by reasoning from the impossibility of the contrary, we can demonstrate Christianity’s truth.
Looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge.
The long and short of it is that all other worldviews and belief systems except Christianity are contradictory.
My position is that Christianity’s presuppositions can explain human observations and that no other worldview can.
But how do you go about proving these assertions? By asking me questions? So, my inability to answer an epistemological or meta-ethical question is supposed to prove your assertions? My inability to answer a question means that all of naturalism (or a posteriori physicalism) is false? You know that this is not how debate works. If you make an assertion, it is your job to support it.
My point is that you have an argument that you must support. All of the claims you made above are part of your argument. Don't shy away from them.
Because you say that you are a presuppositionalist and that you "do argue like one," I am going to simply assume that you are utilizing TAG as expressed below:
Universal Morality TAG (UMT)
P1: If universal moral standards exist, then the Christian God exists.
P2: Universal moral standards exist.
C: Therefore, the Christian God exists.
or
Universal Laws of Logic TAG (ULT)
P1: If universal laws of logic exist, then the Christian God exists.
P2: Universal laws of logic exist.
C: Therefore, the Christian God exists.
If I am being presumptuous in this, please let me know. I simply refuse to answer your questions about morality and logic if you are unwilling to explain to me why these are significant in a discussion about the existence of the Christian God.
My challenge to you is to support the premises of this argument. Explain to me why the first premise of TAG must be true. You say yourself, "Looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge." Support this. Give reason for it.
In my last comment on your previous post, I wrote, "I suggest that we pursue two different threads in this discussion. In one thread, I will directly respond to your questions (even though I believe that they are rhetorical and only meant to set a trap). You can make arguments against what I say there. In the other thread, you present some kind of positive argument for the existence of your god (whether it is TAG or some other argument that ends in "Therefore, God exists.")."
I'm asking you to own up to your assertions, and now I'll turn to mine.
If I assume UMT above, the second premise states:
Universal moral standards exist.
Must I accept this premise?
First of all, what is meant by "universal moral standards"? Do you mean that everyone holds the same standards universally or do you mean that everyone should hold them universally? The former is patently false (think of a culture that thinks it is morally right to ritualistically sacrifice another human being). The later, however, is itself a moral statement (i.e. it says that we "should" hold this standard universally).
If the Christian can only say that moral standards should be held universally, but are not, then it seems there is no way to establish the second premise of UMT that universal moral standards exist.
When Bahnsen debated Stein, he seemed to argue for the idea that moral standards are held universally. He said:
If there are no laws of morality, I'd just take out a gun right now and say, " OK, Dr. Stein, make my day: is there a God or not". You see, if he says, "Oh no, you can't murder me because there are laws of morality," of course he has made my day, because I've won the debate. That shows that the atheist's universe is not correct.
But if he says "Oh no, there are no absolute standards; it's all by convention and
stipulation," then I just pull the trigger and I win the debate anyway.
You see, by Stein saying that it would be "wrong" to shoot him, then, presumably, he is depending on some kind of universal standard of morality. Bahnsen makes it sound like this moral judgment would not be valid if it were relativistic.
But are all relative judgments invalid?
Consider motion. Imagine sitting next to me in a bar when I suddenly begin screaming, "My Guiness is moving! Sweet Lola, save me, my Guiness is moving!" You look at my glass, however, and say, "Man, atheism is really rat poison to the intellect! Your Guiness isn't moving; it's perfectly still."
Is it both possible that my Guiness is moving and that my Guiness is not moving? Of course it is!
I could respond to your skepticism, "Isn't this continent drifting, the earth rotating and revolving, our solar system spinning in a pinwheel galaxy, and our galaxy speeding away from others in the universe? How can you say my Guiness isn't moving?!"
At the same time, you could have said, "Look EB, there is a spot on the bar next to your glass and we can tell by this ruler that your glass is neither moving towards that spot nor away from it. Your glass is stationary."
Both contradictory statements are correct, but are relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworks. From certain spatio-temporal frameworks, my Guiness is stationary; from others, it is moving. The "fact" of the motion of my Guiness is relative to the spatio-temporal framework that is adopted. There is no one, "true" spatio-temporal framework that truly determines whether something is "really" moving or not, there are only different frameworks from which to judge.
But though my Guiness' motion is relative, it is still "objective." You would certainly admit the validity of my statement that my Guiness is moving from any of the other spatio-temporal frameworks that I mentioned as justification. I would certainly admit the validity of your statement from the spatio-temporal framework that you mention. Both statements are correct, but are so relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworks.
Now, what if the same could be said of moral judgments? What if I could say objectively that it is morally wrong of P to D (I'm stealing all of this from Princeton's Gilbert Harman if you are wondering), but had to qualify my statement that it was morally wrong according to a specific moral framework? My judgment would be objective, but not universal.
If morality is not universal, though, must I accept everyone's moral judgments as equally valid? Of course not. For one thing, it is certainly possible that someone makes a moral judgment that does not fit the moral framework they use to justify it [Just like it would be possible for someone to say that something is stationary from a framework in which that judgment is inconsistent].
Secondly, acknowledging that a belief may be justified by reference to another moral framework does not mean that I have to abandon my own moral framework. For example, I believe that it is morally wrong to rape someone. If I were to happen upon a man trying to rape a woman, my moral framework demands that I do whatever action is permissible according to that framework to prevent that action from taking place. I may acknowledge that the action is permissible according to the rapist's moral framework, but that does not mean that I must ignore what is demanded by my own moral framework.
Moral relativism, then, does not necessarily lead to moral nihilism.
Anyone familiar with Foucault's work on power structures will know that, if he is correct, social ideas and morality are shaped by power. There is nothing called "madness" out in the world. One cannot catch "madness" in a bucket and paint it pink. It is an idea that must be defined. Originally, the church and the family were the primary power structures that made this definition. The church needed a way to distinguish between God's directions to his people through the Holy Spirit and the babblings of a madman. People that had certain heretical "visions" and "promptings" from God were considered "mad." Now, it is the physicians who define these kind of terms. Whatever the age, though, power is the driver behind these definitions.
In the case of morality, then, power will be the stabilizing (or destabilizing) force behind societal morality. Obviously, that does not mean that one must accept society's morality (both the Christians here and myself reject our current society's morality, but for drastically different reasons). For example, though most of current, American society opposes same-sex marriage, I adamantly support it. I do not have to accept the majority opinion even if I acknowledge that that opinion is justified by reference to a certain moral framework. I can exert my power (however limited it is) to try to change societal opinion. I can also point out that denying homosexual couples marriage is inconsistent with other, primary societal values like equal treatment under the law.
Just like one can make objective statements about motion even though the statements are relative to spatio-temporal frameworks, so I can make objective statements about morality that are relative to specific moral frameworks. So, contrary to Bahnsen's argument, I can be outraged by the Holocaust and not have a universal morality to do so. Does someone else have to agree with my outrage? Certainly not, but I will exert every power available to me via my moral framework (which excludes violence) to make others see things my way. Morality, like every idea (according to Foucault) is a power struggle.
So, let's return to UMT. It states that universal moral standards exist. Yet moral diversity exists. If Bahnsen had threatened Bernd Juergen B, the German man who wanted to be killed and eaten, Bernd may not have stated that it was wrong from him to do so. Even moral self-preservation is not held universally.
In the moral relativism I state above, I present a hypothesis. I only ask "What if morality is relative?" and I go on to show that it would look much like the world we live in now.
If there were no universal moral standards, then one would expect a lot of moral diversity. There is a lot of moral diversity. One would not expect diversity if universal moral standards were held universally. If the Christian is only saying that moral standards should be held universally, then there is no way to prove that universal moral standards exist; the Christian can only cry out, "Everyone should agree with my moral standards!"
So, to the question, "How do I account for universal moral standards in my worldview?" I answer, "I don't." People do not agree on any universal moral standards, so it certainly seems possible that they do not exist. [Please note that I am not speaking for all atheists. Many atheists (if not most) are moral objectivists/realists. They are not relativists. Again, though, I'm giving one hypothesis. There are others that would work.]
Relative moral standards are not impossible to account for in a physicalist's worldview. There is no "contradiction" in my worldview if I hold that moral standards are relative.
If you believe that moral standards are universal, I want to see your argument. I argue that the moral diversity that exists in the world is best explained by moral relativism. Now, it is your turn to explain why you believe moral standards are universal.
Let me move on to "universal laws of logic."
Above I laid out ULT:
P1: If universal laws of logic exist, then the Christian God exists.
P2: Universal laws of logic exist.
C: Therefore, the Christian God exists.
I still contend that it is up to the Christian theist to support these premises (and this is what I would like you to do, Karen).
But let's turn again to premise two: Universal laws of logic exist.
Here's a question: "How do we know that the laws of logic are truly universal and not only seemingly so?"
I highly recommend Steven Pinker's book The Language Instinct or any of Chomsky's works on "deep structure."
Pinker makes an extremely strong case that grammar is hard-wired into the human brain. This can be proven by studies with infants and patients who have sustained brain traumas.
Steven Pinker's work (expanding on Chomsky's) has shown that the brain has different grammatical "sections" inside it. One section holds information about nouns, another verbs, another conjunctions. (Brain damage, called aphasia, can affect certain sections of the brain without affecting others--e.g. after a head trauma in a certain region of the brain, a person can retain all abilities, but the ability to recognize nouns.)
Our brains determine how we perceive reality. Mind-altering drugs alter our perception of reality, for instance.
Logic is all about relating objects. There are certain words that are crucial to logical understanding. Words like "and," "or," "not," "is," etc. are all about relationships.
Here's my hypothesis. Our brains are hard-wired for grammar through natural selection. Our perception of the world is governed by our brains. Our brains have a natural tendency to categorize objects (or perceived objects) and then to relate them. Our biological make-up causes us to perceive the world with linguistic concepts like "and," "or," "not," "is," etc. These linguistic concepts make up our laws of logic. These logical laws can seem universal to us because our understanding of the "universe" is governed by our brains. We cannot know if the laws of logic are really universal or only seemingly so. We cannot escape our brains to see how the world "really is."
Now, if my hypothesis were true, what would we expect to see? We would expect that people with brain damage or "abnormal" brains would be illogical. Because their brains did not function "normally" they would hold a different logic. They would see the world differently. And that's exactly what we see happening.
Now, does this mean that the law of contradiction is not universal? Can I be exbeliever and not-exbeliever at the same time? No, not when it is formulated in this way. What I am suggesting is that it is our brains that make us see things in relation to one another. They supply the grammar that makes up our laws of logic. If our brains did not group objects and then relate them, we would not understand the universe "logically."
So, those are my answers to your questions.
Your underlying argument is that an atheistic physicalist cannot account for certain things that exist in the world. I have given two possible solutions above. An atheistic physicalist can account for her moral judgments through moral relativism (and, probably other means that I did not argue). An atheistic physicalist can account for laws of logic that have a biological and linguistic basis.
While I am not saying that I am convinced that moral relativism is actually the case, I do think it better accounts for moral diversity than your belief that universal moral standards exist. Also, while I am not certain that the laws of logic come about because of biology and language, I think my hypothesis makes perfect sense of the illogical ways of those with brain damage.
In both cases, I have given a plausible account within an atheistic physicalist worldview (something you believed was impossible).
I hope I have fulfilled my obligation to you. You wanted to know how a physicalist could account for moral judgments and laws of logic. I believe I have done both. I'm sure you will not be satisfied with my answers and will want to continue to discuss them. I am perfectly willing to do so.
But . . .
I really must insist that you support the assertions that you have made and explain why your questions are relevant to the question of the existence of the Christian God. Why is it relevant to ask, "How do you account for universal moral standards in your physicalist worldview?" Why is it relevant to ask, "How do you account for universal laws of logic in your physicalist worldview?"
You are making bold assertions that must be supported. I don't want to be the only one putting ideas out there. Remember, you have a positive belief about the proposition, "A god or gods exist." I do not have a positive belief about that proposition or the proposition, "No god or gods exist." You must support the propositions that you hold.
Let me address one comment you made in your post. You wrote:
However, here’s where I think we disagree: you say that since we can’t (deductively) prove God’s existence, we should assume he doesn’t exist.
Let's say I held the proposition, "Shy, magic, invisible elves exist." According to your method, on what basis could you reject my proposition? Do you believe that you would have to come up with an argument why shy, magic, invisible elves do not exist? Do you believe that you would have to assume that shy, magic, invisible elves exist and show that it is contradictory before you could reject it?
I know that it sounds ridiculous to you to consider the existence of "shy, magic, invisible elves," but try to imagine how ridiculous it is to me when you tell me that there is a living, non-corporal being who has thoughts but no brain. This goes against everything that I have ever experienced. Every living thing that I have encountered is organic. Every creature that thinks does so through a brain. Your suggestion of a non-corporal being is as odd to me as shy, magic, invisible elves are to you.
What makes this harder to take is that Christians try to push this fanciful "being" off as an answer to everything. Why is it raining? Shy, magic, invisible elves make it rain. How do you account for the universal laws of logic? Shy, magic, invisible elves. How do you explain the origin of the universe? Shy, magic, invisible elves.
Whenever you say "God," I think of something as absurd as shy, magic, invisible elves.
When you reference "God," you are not mentioning something that is within my realm of experience. In your post, you wrote, "We all have unprovable assumptions. For example, I sincerely hope we both believe that other people have minds, yet this is not a provable statement." But, contrary to Plantinga's argument, this is not the same thing.
I have a "mind" (I'm not a dualist, but I think minds are possible by supervening on physical brains). Having a mind, then, is within my experience. I often read a poet or song-writer who expresses something that I think in my mind, but didn't have the words to express. These words definitely aren't my own, but they closely parallel feelings that I have. It seems reasonable for me to conclude that these words are the expression of another mind. They are not my words, yet they resonate in my mind.
"God" is something different than other minds. You say that your god lives but does so non-corporally. This is as close to my experience as shy, magic, invisible elves. Extraordinary claims (i.e. ones that are very far outside of my experience) demand some kind of support. The existence of a god or gods is an extraordinary claim.
So, if someone came up to me and said, "Shy, magic, invisible elves want you to give them ten percent of your income and to make the check payable to me," I would demand proof of their claim before I forked over any cash. But imagine that conversation if they were like you:
ex: "Prove to me that shy, magic, invisible elves exist."
invisible elf guy (ieg): "There is no deductive proof of shy, magic, invisible elves. You must assume they exist and see if my worldview is correct."
ex: "Look, man. I can't see shy, magic, invisible elves."
ieg: "Of course not. They are invisible! Duh."
ex: "Okay, well tell one to say something to me."
ieg: "Dude, I told you they were shy. They won't speak to you."
ex: "If they are shy that means they will avoid detection."
ieg: "Yep."
ex: "Then on what basis am I supposed to believe that they exist?"
ieg: "Faith."
[shy, magic, invisible fairy guy (ifg) walks up]
ifg: "Shy, magic, invisible fairies exist, but not shy, magic, invisible elves!"
ex: "Forget it."
Karen, to me, you aren't making a claim like "other minds exist;" you are making a claim like "shy, magic, invisible elves exist." Why should I not be able to reject the proposition "shy, magic, invisible elves exist" simply because there is no evidence for it. Why can't I reject the proposition, "A god or gods exist" simply because there is no evidence for it?
So, here is where we are at.
You have made a lot of assertions about Christianity and about atheists. I think it is time to support those assertions. I took the time to address your questions directly, I think it is only fair that you address your assertions directly.
I hope that you are finding this discussion useful. If there is something in your post that you would like me to address more directly, let me know.
You know, Exbeliever, it’s a little bit like you’re responding to your interpretation of Greg Bahnsen’s apologetic rather than to the arguments and challenges I made in my post. In your last comment, you wrote, “You have made a lot of assertions about Christianity and about atheists. I think it is time to support those assertions. I took the time to address your questions directly. I think it is only fair that you address your assertions directly.”
Unless I misunderstand you, you’re telling me that (1) I made assertions without supporting them and that (2) I asked you questions, presumably in place of supporting my claims.
It is true that I made assertions. However, it is not true that I asked you questions about universal morality and/or universal logic in my last post. Originally, I did ask about morality, but at this point, that question is not on the table. It is also not true that I did not support my assertions. It is quite possible you have a problem with my method of support, but since you didn’t address my support or my method, I’m not sure. All you did was criticize people who make the TAG and only support their argument with questions. I did not do that, nor have I ever done that.
It seems to me that you criticized one form of the argument that people who call themselves presuppositionalists make, but that you did not address the argument I made. That’s the equivalent of me criticizing the definition of atheism that some people who call themselves atheists hold, but failing to address the definition you presented.
Let me state, as succinctly as possible, the argument I did make. We are debating worldviews and presuppositions, and the way to demonstrate the truth or falsity of assumptions is through using the criterion of explanatory power. Assuming an impersonal beginning fails to meet this criterion; assuming a personal beginning does meet this criterion. Thus, we are justified in assuming the truth of my worldview.*
You gave your own version of this “impossibility of the contrary” argument:
P1: Either the Christian worldview is true or another worldview is true.
P2: It is not the case that another worldview is true.
C: Therefore, the Christian worldview is true.
As far as I can see, my statement of the argument and your statement of the argument are equivalent. If you agree that we’re talking about the same thing, then great. Your formulation of the “impossibility of the contrary” seems fair.
You originally asked me to provide a deductive proof for the existence of God. I declined. Now we’re back at the deductive proof issue again. Above you outlined a deductive proof for the truth of the Christian worldview. Indirectly, it proves God’s existence, so I guess you could say it qualifies as a deductive proof. On the other hand, since we arrive at this conclusion by first assuming a worldview’s truth and then employing explanatory power, maybe it’s not traditionally or technically deductive. I’m not sure, but in either case, it shouldn’t affect our discussion.
After you presented this proof, you questioned the premises. Right now, I don’t have time to discuss the first one. After I get back from camp, I’ll be happy to. Your objection to the second premise was that Internet presuppositionalists only support it by asking “epistemological or meta-ethical questions.”
Now, I did support my argument, on (1) the metaphysical level and (2) the ethical level. In both of these areas, I showed that assuming an impersonal beginning does not meet the explanatory power standard and that assuming a personal beginning does. You did not directly respond to my arguments, however.
To the best of my knowledge, all you did was repeat the moral argument that I refuted in the body of my post. I noted that I had read your moral argument and that I would respond to it to save you the trouble of making it over again. You made it over again anyway, ignoring my response.
If I missed something and am misrepresenting your response, I really am sorry. Please set me right if that’s the case. It really does seem to me that I have supported my “bold” assertions.
Tomorrow morning I’m leaving, so count on it being at least a week, if not longer, before I can write again.
*I realize that “personal beginning” doesn’t equal my worldview, and that may indeed be something we discuss later. If you don’t mind, though, we can cross that bridge when we come to it and focus on the impersonal versus personal right now.
Karen,
Please indulge me a few unsupported assertions, here, before I address what you've just said.
Debating the truth of Christianity is different than debating the question "are economic sanctions morally justified?" for instance. The Christian's whole life is built around their faith. Their friends, their activities, their morality, everything revolves around being a Christian.
Because of this, Christians are willing to go to extraordinary lengths to deny it when confronted with something that challenges their faith.
You see this, most blantantly, in debates over the inerrancy of Christian Scripture.
A "errantist" might point to differing accounts of the resurrection in the gospels. They might say, "One account records one man at the tomb, another account records two men, and another records angels."
Instead of admitting the, seemingly, obvious (i.e. that the accounts contradict one another), the apologist says something like, "Just because one writer doesn't mention two men doesn't mean there weren't two there, and it is not improper to call angels men."
You see, their unwavering commitment to the topic they are debating causes them to overlook and reinterpret evidence to the contrary.
Recently, a friend of mine summed it up nicely. He wrote:
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It works like this. Imagine I claim that my neighbor mowed his lawn yesterday. You claim he had a lawn service do it.
I point out that I saw him getting out his tractor, and filling it with gas yesterday morning. You start to apply apologetics, and point out how people use lawn tractors for things other than mowing, and that perhaps he was moving dirt instead.
I point out how:
1) He is money conscious
2) He was sharpening his blades
3) He had fresh-cut grass clippings on his mower later
4) He had a sunburned head.
You point out:
1) Perhaps it was cheaper to have a lawn service for once,
2) Just because he sharpened the blades doesn’t mean he didn’t use them
3) His mower could have picked up the grass clippings when driving, but not mowing,
4) He could have been outside working elsewhere.
That is apologetics. Taking each minute item from the big picture and attempt to explain it away.
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Why do I mention this? Because it seems that you have abandoned commitments that you recently held and have put together an ad hoc argument in order to continue arguing for your faith (though, as I will demonstrate, it really is no different).
Let's go back to some statements you made less than a month ago on another blog. You wrote:
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We actually can prove that Christianity is the only philosophically defensible belief system. There’s no way to scientifically prove any worldview, because scientific reasoning depends upon observing repeatable processes. For that reason, when we speak of “proving” Christianity we aren’t claiming we can show Christianity to be true by the same means we show the boiling point of water to be 1000 C or 2120 F. What we are saying is that by reasoning from the impossibility of the contrary, we can demonstrate Christianity’s truth.
Looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge. Various forms of naturalism claim that the laws of logic are societal conventions, not transcendent absolutes. But, if this is so, then we have no guarantee that they are true all the time; we have no basis for operating according to what they say. If the laws of logic are social conventions, rather like the laws of grammar, then they are culturally relative and do not provide us with a good reason to follow them. A naturalist can’t account for the laws of logic in his worldview – he can’t defend it philosophically.
The various religions that claim an impersonal deity created the universe (or that the universe itself is eternal) have to claim that the personal arose from the impersonal, another belief that is not philosophically sound.
The long and short of it is that all other worldviews and belief systems except Christianity are contradictory. That’s why we can have confidence in our faith. We aren’t stuck with hoping for the best or living out Pascal’s wager – we actually can be certain that what we believe is true.
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Also, more recently, you have said to me:
My question for you is, do you believe goodness is transcendent and universal, and if you do, how can you explain that in the context of your worldview?
However, if universal and transcendental goodness isn’t possible in your system, yet you claim to believe in it, that most definitely does affect the consistency of your worldview.
It now appears that you have changed tactics. Now, you say, "Originally, I did ask about morality, but at this point, that question is not on the table."
I guess I wasn't aware that we were starting the conversation over with this newest post.
Before I move on to your newest arguments, though, I want to defend my statements above. I want to demonstrate that, until recently, you were making the exact arguments that I described.
The first statement that I want to discuss is this one:
What we are saying is that by reasoning from the impossibility of the contrary, we can demonstrate Christianity’s truth.
I formulated this argument as follows:
P1: Either the Christian worldview is true or another worldview is true.
P2: It is not the case that another worldview is true.
C: Therefore, the Christian worldview is true.
You responded, "As far as I can see, my statement of the argument and your statement of the argument are equivalent. If you agree that we’re talking about the same thing, then great. Your formulation of the 'impossibility of the contrary' seems fair."
I challenged you to support the premises of this argument. For the purpose of this debate, though, I said that I would concede the first premise for the sake of argument. The exclusivity of Christianity is an inside debate. I will accept your first premise without support so that we can move on to the second premise (which I believe to be more important).
I said that most internet presuppositionalists seem to try to support the second claim by asking epistemological and meta-ethical questions instead of offering straight forward support. An example of this kind of question would be, "My question for you is, do you believe goodness is transcendent and universal, and if you do, how can you explain that in the context of your worldview?" A particular atheists inability to answer the question is supposed to provide support to the claim that "It is not the case that another worldview is true."
You claim to have gone further than this in your most recent post. You say, "Now, I did support my argument, on (1) the metaphysical level and (2) the ethical level. In both of these areas, I showed that assuming an impersonal beginning does not meet the explanatory power standard and that assuming a personal beginning does."
Now, I'll discuss your "supports" below, but I want to point out exactly what it would mean to support the premise "It is not the case that another worldview is true." This would be a never-ending task that would never allow you to get to your conclusion. If you discovered, studied, and "disproved" 2000 worldviews, you still have not supported the premise "It is not the case that another worldview is true." You would have to demonstrate the falsity of every worldview that has ever been held, is held, or ever will be held. This is exactly why presuppositionalism doesn't rely on this argument alone, but instead presents TAG.
Let's look at another statement you make:
Looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge.
If I were speaking to you in person, I think something like the following conversation would occur:
"Exbeliever, looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge."
"What is Christianity's 'basis for knowledge'?"
"It's that the Christian God created the universe in such a way that it works according to rules. These rules are both physical and logical laws."
"So, then, is it fair to say that without the Christian God, the universe would not be governed by physical and logical laws?"
"Yes. In a universe that came about by chance, there is no way to account for physical and logical laws."
"Then, is it fair to summarize what you are saying as, 'If there are physical and logical laws, then the Christian God must exist,'?"
"Yes. That is fair. If the Christian God did not exist, then there would be no basis for knowledge. There would be no reason to believe that the physical or logical laws of the universe would be constant."
"Well, do you believe that there are physical and logical laws?"
"I certainly do. Physical laws are needed to make sense of our physical experience, and logical laws make reason possible."
"So, now we can summarize what you've said as, 'If physical and logical laws exist (i.e. the basis of knowledge), then the Christian God exists. Physical and logical laws exist.'"
"That sounds fair. I agree with both of those statements."
"Then it seems we have a transcendental argument. It goes, 'If physical and logical laws exist (i.e. the basis of knowledge), then the Christian God exists. Physical and logical laws exist. Therefore God exists.'"
Of course this imaginary conversation is unfair. I am, literally, putting words in your mouth. But I don't think they are words that you disagree with. I also think that they are implied in your positive assertions.
You claim that Christianity is the only belief system that provides a basis of knowledge. You immediately followed up your claim by referring to laws of logic. Here is your argument in context:
Looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge. Various forms of naturalism claim that the laws of logic are societal conventions, not transcendent absolutes. But, if this is so, then we have no guarantee that they are true all the time; we have no basis for operating according to what they say. If the laws of logic are social conventions, rather like the laws of grammar, then they are culturally relative and do not provide us with a good reason to follow them. A naturalist can’t account for the laws of logic in his worldview – he can’t defend it philosophically.
Apparently, then, you equate "basis of knowledge" with "laws of logic." I believe my presentation of ULT, above, is a fair summary of what you say in your comment. I said:
P1: If universal laws of logic exist, then the Christian God exists.
P2: Universal laws of logic exist.
C: Therefore, the Christian God exists.
From your comment, I can't see how you would disagree with a word of this. You claim that Christianity alone gives us a "basis of knowledge." You equate "basis of knowledge" with "laws of logic." If I were to ask you how Christianity provides us with a basis of knowledge/laws of logic, I have no doubt that your answer would be something like, "In the Christian worldview we can account for universal laws of logic by reference to the Christian God. We believe the Christian God created a universe that is governed by universal laws of logic."
So, tell me, how does my ULT in any way misrepresent your statements? You state that only Christianity can account for laws of logic (i.e. a "basis of knowledge"). Your "account" for these laws of logic rests on the existence of the Christian God (i.e. if the Christian God did not exist, then there would be no laws of logic/basis of knowledge). You believe that laws of logic exist. The clear implication of your statements and your unspoken "account" is ULT.
I would like to know what there is in ULT that you do not agree with. Do you disagree with the first premise that states, "If universal laws of logic exist, then the Christian God exists"? Do you disagree with the second premise, "Universal laws of logic exist"? Do you disagree with the conclusion, "Therefore, the Christian God exists"? From your previous statements, I can't see anything that you would have a problem with.
But you say, "It seems to me that you criticized one form of the argument that people who call themselves presuppositionalists make, but that you did not address the argument I made."
Actually, I do believe I addressed the argument that you made before this post. Am I to believe that in the past two weeks, you have completely changed your apologetic approach? Do you no longer believe the statements that you made on May 25th? As I demonstrated above, your May 25th comments explicitly support TAG as I expresed it above.
You said that what I stated above is my "interpretation of Greg Bahnsen’s apologetic." Actually, this is my interpretation of Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, Cornelius Van Til, and others. If you think I have misrepresented presuppositionalism, I would really be interested in how you interpret their writing. Do you think that my "interpretation" is incorrect?
Also, you have stated that you are a presuppositionalist. Every presuppositionalist I am familiar with argues in the way I stated above (actually, in fairness, Frame is more tolerant of traditional proofs of God's existence than either Van Til or Bahnsen). If your arguments are so different than the argument that "people who call themselves presuppositionalists make," how are you a presuppositionalist?
Since the arguments I presented above are not your arguments, though, will you join me in rejecting them as proof of God's existence? Are you willing to say that TAG is not a sound proof for God's existence? You must have distanced yourself from these arguments for a reason. I've stated that I've seen no sound proof for the existence of the Christian God. Will you admit that the TAG I presented above is (1) the TAG that Van Til, Bahnsen, and Frame present in their writings and (2) unsound?
If you think I have misrepresented presuppositionalism, please read this post in which I support my assertions with citations from Frame, Bahnsen, and Van Til.
If you agree that I have presented their argument correctly, will you also agree (since you are distancing yourself from the argument) that it is unsound?
Since, it seems, you have distanced yourself from TAG and from your May 25th comments, let's look at your new "arguments."
In your "Metaphysical Challenge," you state, "to explain the existence of personality, the Christian worldview is necessary." I'll examine this below in more detail, but first, I need to look at some of your assumptions.
You say, "Unlike all animals and other life forms, humans appear to possess personality."
I'm not sure I buy this. If by personality, we mean "individual, distinctive qualities," I would definitely say that animals have those. Curled up at my feet as I type is a beautiful, white cat named Abigail. Whenever people visit us, they are instantly drawn to her. She's like a Siren the way she lures people to her and she's almost as deadly ;). I love my cat, but frankly, she's somewhat of a turd (and I'm toning down my language for your blog here). She will be affectionate one minute and attack you the next. She is obnoxiously persistent when it comes to getting her way in certain areas.
My in-laws live down the street. They have a beautiful black cat named Samantha. Samantha doesn't have the ability to lure people to her like Abigail, but she is honestly the sweetest cat on the planet. She isn't destructive. She'll sit on your lap for hours and let you pet her. She's extremely affectionate and never mean-spirited.
Now, notice how I describe the two cats. I describe "personality traits." Perhaps, you might say that I am only speaking anthropomorphically. I might say, however, that you are being "speciest"--I'm one of those animal-rights, vegetarian guys, by the way.
Perhaps, your assertion is itself an issue that must be decided by worldviews. As someone who thinks that Darwinian evolution sounds pretty reasonable, I have no reason to believe that humans "are [distinctively] different from any other organism in the universe." First, your statement is very bold. How do you know that there isn't another planet a few galaxies away that has life exactly like ours? Second, humans and chimps share at least 95% of our DNA. It seems to me that we are very much like other animals. The primary difference I see is that we have bigger brains.
But maybe this isn't that big of a deal to your argument. Let's turn to the specifics.
You state, "to explain the existence of personality, the Christian worldview is necessary."
You mention a brute fact that needs explaining--"humans appear to possess personality."
Next, you say, "all our experience dictates that only personality can create personality."
You also make some negative statments. You said that one "may claim that the personal arose from the impersonal. This, however, cannot be true. We have absolutely no reason so accept this idea. It’s totally unfounded, and nothing in our human experience attests to this being possible."
You also said, "it’s impossible for the impersonal to create the personal."
And, "We could deny that man is a personal being. Yet, this approach is seriously flawed, as well. The first problem is that this interpretation is inconsistent with the whole of human experience. The second problem is that this interpretation forces us into determinism."
There are a lot of assertions here that seem to need some support. After all, in our first series of comments, you did say, "The one who makes the claim has the burden to uphold it."
You have made a claim about personality. You believe that it can only be accounted for in the Christian worldview. You believe that the way it is accounted for in the Christian worldview is that "a personal God created personality."
I know that you have tried to avoid these deductive arguments, but you keep making them without stating them explicitly. Your argument is:
P1: If personality exists, then the Christian God exists.
P2: Personality exists.
C: Therefore the Christian God exists.
You put it in different terms, but this is exactly what you are saying. You say, "to explain the existence of personality, the Christian worldview is necessary." How does the Christian worldview explain the existence of personality? "[A] personal God created personality." So, what you are saying is that personality cannot be explained without the Christian God. That is premise #1. You say that personality exists. That is premise #2. The conclusion follows from the premise.
You say that personality can only be explained by the Christian God, right? You say that personality exists, right? You conclude that the Christian God exists, right?
But how do you support premise #1? The impossibility of the contrary. You give a few of the other explanations for personality, conclude that they do not explain it, and therefore state that the Christian answer (i.e. "[A] personal God created personality") must be true.
Well, first of all, you did not even prove that the other explanations you gave were false (I demonstrate this below). Second, even if you had proven that the other explanations that you provided were false, that doesn't mean that you have proven the impossibility of the contrary. Isn't it possible that you don't know every possible explanation for personality. If you are going to prove the impossibility of the contrary, you must know every single contrary imaginable. You still would not have established your first premise.
Let's look at another of your statements: "all our experience dictates that only personality can create personality."
I think I must be overlooking something. In what experiences do we observe "personality creating personality"? Are you talking about "reproduction"? I don't equate "reproduction" with "creation," do you? I don't think of "creation" as a biological process like reproduction is. I can create a work of art (well, at least, some people can; I'm not artistically-inclined). I don't think I could "create" personality.
Maybe you could clarify this for me. Where, in our experience, do we see personality creating personality and not merely "reproducing" it? It is not as obvious to me as it seems to you.
It also seems that we might have different ideas about what "personality" is. It seems to me that personality is biological, specifically neurological. A change in the brain results in a change in personality.
When I was still in Christian circles, I knew an older, married couple (yikes, I just realized that this "older couple" was probably my age now!). They were both devout Christians. The man was in a car accident and sustained a head trauma. Before the accident, he was a loving, tender husband and father. After the accident he became emotionally abusive (and, at times, almost became physically abusive). He berated his wife and children and cursed at them unmercifully. This man's brain damage was in his ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the area of the brain that governs aggression.
Here, we have a neurological change that caused a personality change. There are many examples of this medically.
A more famous example is of Phineas Gage. A dynamiting accident caused brain damage that completely changed his personality. You can read about the whole case here. The most interesting and relevant part is his story.
If it is true that a change in the brain causes a change in personality, then it certainly seems that the brain is responsible for personality, doesn't it? But you say that this "forces us into determinism." You say that if determinism is true, then "We, and all our seeming 'personality are only the effects of previous chemical causes, which were themselves merely effects. When we take this approach and deny personality, we deny the 'mannishness' of man [and the womanishness of woman]. We deny ourselves."
But what if determinism is the case? Saying that if it is the case "We deny ourselves," is hardly an argument against determinism. It only says, "I don't like the consequences of determinism, therefore it is not true."
Let's look at a few more examples like the ones I mentioned above (see this article for citations from the medical journals describing these cases):
A Jesuit priest had a stroke that damaged the right hemisphere of his brain. After the accident, he lost the ability to have intense emotions. He joked when his parents told him that his sister had leukemia and he lost all of his passion for his ministry. His parents complained to the doctor, "That's not the way our son acted before he became sick . . . He now sounds like a robot."
"Mary" was a student at an Ivy-league school. During her first two years, she did extremely well. She was a devout Baptist who did not drink or sleep around. During her third year, however, Mary became belligerent to other people, started drinking heavily, and became very sexually active. She could not explain why her behavior had changed so dramatically. An MRI revealed that Mary had a tumor in the frontal lobes of her brain (the area of the brain that controls impulses). Almost immediately after the removal of the tumor, Mary's behavior changed back to what it was before.
Another man was a teacher who suddenly became obsessed with sex with minors. He was convicted on molestation charges. He said that he couldn't understand why he couldn't resist his impulses. An MRI revealed that he, too, had a tumor in the frontal lobes of his brain. After the removal, the man claimed that he no longer had the desire for aberrant sex acts. A few years later, though, the man started having headaches and began buying pornography again. He went to the doctor and an MRI revealed that the tumor had begun growing back.
A hard-working Baptist minister who had refused pay from his church (choosing, rather, to support himself so that the church could direct funds elsewhere) began showing up late for appointments, then skipping them altogether, then doing nothing but sitting in front of the TV even choosing to urinate on himself rather than go to the bathroom. An MRI showed that there was a tumor pressing on his frontal lobes. After the removal of the tumors, he began faithfully working again and living an active life.
All of these cases show that a neurological change affects personality. It seems to me that impersonal biology is responsible for personality. I see no reason to accept your proposition that "it cannot be true . . . that the personal arose from the impersonal." On the contrary, it seems to me that it is quite clear that impersonal biology is responsible for personality. My assumption seems to have the greatest "explanatory power." I can explain why a change in the brain changes personality. If you believe that the soul (as a god's creation) is the source of personality, then it seems odd that brain damage would change personality, doesn't it?
You began by saying that "to explain the existence of personality, the Christian worldview is necessary." You list possible non-theistic explanations. You say that "all our experience dictates that only personality can create personality," but you failed to list any of that experience. In the absence of specific examples, I was left to ask myself where I see any personality creating personality. The only possible example I could think of was the act of "reproduction." "Reproduction," however, seems very different from "creation" to me. I am simply at a loss to think of an example.
Another possibility you mentioned was determinism. You equated this idea, however, with the idea that there is no personality--"We could deny that man is a personal being. . . this interpretation forces us into determinism." You're argument against determinism was (1) "all our seeming 'personality' are only the effects of previous chemical causes, which were themselves merely effects," and (2)"When we take this approach and deny personality, we deny the 'mannishness' of man. We deny ourselves."
Your first "argument" against it is only a restatement of determinism. Determinism is simply the belief that our "seeming personality" is the effect of biological causes. Restating a position is not arguing against it.
Your second "argument" is the equivalent of saying, "I don't like the consequences of determinism, therefore it is false." In your opinion, determinism denies what it means to be human. Let's say that it does. Okay, but if determinism is actually the case, then we must deny our humanity. Well, maybe that is something that you don't want to do, but that doesn't mean that determinism is false.
But, maybe, since it appears that determinism may be true, we need to redefine what it means to be human so that our definition fits the determinism that seems to be the case.
It seems to me that impersonal neurology explains the existence of personality just fine.
You disagree. You say that "A personal beginning, by contrast, can easily account for personality: a personal God created personality."
Let's look at the difference between our two answers. I spent several paragraphs explaining how the brain can be responsible for personality. I gave verifiable evidence of the relationship between brains and personality. What is your explanation? "[A] personal God created personality." What if I didn't give any support whatsoever for my conclusion "impersonal neurology explains the existence of personality"? Would you be okay with that? Yet this is what presuppositionalists do time and time again. They get the "opponent" talking about an issue that seems removed from the conversation about the existence of a god. They talk about laws of logic, ethical standards, or personality. The non-theist falls for the trap (like I have) and spends pages defending the idea of personality within her worldview. The Christian denies the person's arguments and then says, "No, wrong. God did it."
Presuppositionalism is the biggest dog and pony show around. We can talk about personality and morality until we've used up all of blogger's bandwidth. In the end, though, it will not have proven anything. Your underlying argument is unsound. You hide that fact, however, by getting me to talk about personality or morality or laws of logic.
Here is what you must do, though. You must explain why these questions are relevant to the question of the existence of the Christian God. From what you have said in this post, your argument is something like:
Only the Christian worldview "can explain human observations and [] no other worldview can."
You set out to prove this assertion with specific examples. You say "to explain the existence of personality, the Christian worldview is necessary."
You describe what you think to be an exhaustive list of all of the possible explanations for personality. You set out to disprove those possibilities (and fail to do so, only arguing that you don't like the consequences of determinism if it is true).
In the case of personality, though, not only is there a non-theistic explanation (which I laid out above), but also, you do not know that you have exhausted all of the other possible explanations. Even if you had successfully disproved all of the possibilities you listed, you still would have no way of knowing if one you didn't mention was plausible. Yet, you previously admitted that "The one who makes the claim has the burden to uphold it." Your claim is very bold. It says that "to explain the existence of personality, the Christian worldview is necessary." To uphold that claim you must do something extraordinary. You must show that every possible explanation has been disproven. I don't think that this is even possible. I think the claim is too bold to be supported, personally, but you are the one who made it.
Let's move on to your "Ethical Challenge."
As I look at ethics, my contention is that without a personal God, there is no logical basis for morality.
This is UMT that I stated above. You believe that ethics can't exist without a personal God. Ethics exist, therefore, a personal God exists.
You say that "an impersonal beginning fails to meet the standard of explanatory power."
One of the many things that you did not respond to in my comment above, however, is the fact that I say that the moral relativity I describe better accounts for moral diversity than your argument for universal moral standards. I hope that you will more directly address this in your future comments.
About my comments on moral relativity above, you said, "all you did was repeat the moral argument that I refuted in the body of my post."
I guess I must have missed this "refutation." This is what you wrote:
This argument rests on equivocation. By the end of the argument, morality means something entirely different than it did at the beginning. At the end, morality may be objective, but it’s also nothing more than personal opinion. That fact that my favorite color is purple is also objective, but it’s still personal opinion. If I understand you correctly, morality is no more authoritative than my favorite color or your favorite food. Objective it may be, but it’s also merely opinion. Whoever most successfully foists his opinion on society gets to define morality.
You can say you “believe that it is morally wrong to rape someone,” but not that it is morally wrong to rape someone. There is a huge difference between belief and actuality. Just because you believe something doesn’t make it so. You can believe something, and you can try to impose your belief on others (by fair means or foul), but it’s still a personal opinion. You may have an objective moral framework, but where did the framework originate? Why should we accept it? Because you say so? Again, this isn’t morality anymore; it’s merely opinion.
You say, "If I understand you correctly, morality is no more authoritative than my favorite color or your favorite food."
Then you do not understand me correctly. Whether someone likes a different color than I do or another food does not affect me. If someone thinks it is morally acceptable to kill atheists for sport, though, this affects me. Moral judgments (even if they were purely matters of opinion--which I did not argue they were) would be of more value to the person holding them than color or food preferences.
Again, though, your entire argument against moral relativism sounds like, "I don't like the consequences, therefore, it is wrong." What if moral relativism (in the manner I describe it above) is actually the case? Sure, people want everyone else to hold to their moral judgments. But they don't! There is moral diversity. Do we just have to yell louder, "YOU SHOULD FOLLOW MY MORAL JUDGMENTS!" But they don't!
As far as I can tell, you have not understood my argument well enough to try to refute it. I would appreciate it, if you read my previous comment and dealt with it more seriously. For instance, I find it incredible that you could read what I wrote about morality and conclude, "You can say you 'believe that it is morally wrong to rape someone,' but not that it is morally wrong to rape someone." That is a terrible misreading of what I said.
If the moral relativism that I describe above is actually the case, then I would be able to boldly claim, "It is morally wrong to rape someone." I would be able to say this as confidently as I could say, "That rock isn't moving."
What I would say about both of these statements, however, is that they seem to be relative to frameworks. The rock that I refer to isn't moving from the perspective of a certain spatio-temporal framework. Rape is wrong according to a certain moral framework. Is the rock moving relative to another spatio-temporal framework? Sure. Is rape permissible according to another moral framework? Apparently it is because there are sickos doing it all the time and they don't see anything wrong with it.
But do I have to accept the rapist's moral framework? No. And if my moral framework dictates that it is my duty to stop a rape if I can by physical force, I will perform that duty.
You may not like my answer, but that does not make it wrong. If you want to insist that universal moral standards exist, do so, but I challenge you to back up this assertion. I challenge you to explain moral diversity.
I've said much more about this that you have not addressed in my comment above. I'm going to refer you back to it for further consideration.
Lastly, let's talk about methodology. In the beginning of your post, you write:
Now, what criterion can we use to evaluate the worldviews in question, since deductive proof is not viable? I present the criterion of explanatory power. My position is that Christianity’s presuppositions can explain human observations and that no other worldview can. The choice is between Christianity and inconsistency.
Your argument here is that the worldview that best explains human experiences is the "right" worldview. You look for some human experience and look at it through the different lenses of various worldviews. The worldview that explains those experiences best, you say, is the true one.
Is this really the case, though? I like the way many scientists approach their field. For a long time, physicists have been looking for a "Theory of Everything." They want a theory that perfectly predicts every occurrence in the universe. These same physicists admit, however, that even if they do find a Theory of Everything, that theory might not be "true." In other words, just because this theory explains everything that exists in the universe and its exact state, it is still possible that the universe "really lives" according to another theory. The Theory of Everything works even though it is not the "true" theory.
Now, let's say for a second that Christianity really does explain all of human experience accurately. Does that mean Christianity is true or simply that it explains everything accurately? So, you see, your method can never get you where you want to ultimately end: "The Christian worldview is true," or even "The 'glasses' of the Christian worldview are the only glasses that enable us to see the world clearly and truly" (emphasis added).
But, maybe you are okay with that. I certainly am okay with probability arguments. Most presuppositionalists reject probability arguments. They like to speak in absolutes. But, if Christianity seems the most reasonable explanation of the world, I wouldn't have any problem admitting that (of course, that doesn't mean I would become a Christian, but only that I would admit that it is probably true).
But here's the big issue. As you can see, when you ask about an issue like morality, laws of logic, or personality, I do a great deal of work to answer your questions. Your answer to all of these questions, though, is short and always the same, "God did it."
But in giving this as an answer, you have completely ignored all that I have said above about extraordinary claims.
What if for every question you asked me about these issues, I simply said, "According to my worldview, shy, magic, invisible elves did it." If you asked me how they did it, I would respond, "I don’t have to give provide a specific process in answer to any specific question you may ask, and neither do you. I can’t tell you the specific method shy, magic, invisible elves used to create the world."
My shy, magic, invisible elves worldview has an "answer" for every question you ask, just like your "god" worldview. That "answer," however, isn't reasonable. You have no reason to believe that shy, magic, invisible elves exist. In fact, you have reason to believe they do not exist--it goes against everything that you have experienced. Because it is so outside of your experience, you have no reason to accept my answer.
When asked about laws of logic, morality, and personality, you simply tell me (in one way or another), "God did it." But you say "God" is some living being who thinks but has no brain. It's an extraordinary claim you are making about this being. It is so far outside of my experience, I have no reason to accept your answer.
This is why the question of a god or gods existence preceeds discussion of worldviews. If you are going to use a god as your "answer" for everything, then there needs to be some reason for me to believe that this extraordinary creature could exist in the first place. I can't accept something as an answer if it seems impossible to me that this something can even exist. And I think if I started answering all of your questions with "Shy, magic, invisible elves did it" you would understand the position you are putting me in when you simply "answer" every question with "God did it."
So, where are we in this debate, Karen? Will you defend your methodology? Will you explain to me why tacking the answer "God did it" to every question about human experience makes the Christian worldview "superior to all others" especially when I have no reason to believe anything as extraordinary as a "god" could even exist? Are you going to continue to bring up issues that you think I can't account for without referencing the Christian God to show that your worldview with its wonderfully useful "God did it" answer is "superior to all others"?
I think I have been a "good sport." Even though your methodology is fallacious, I have given, in great detail, my "account" for laws of logic, morality, and personality. I didn't want to look evasive.
From now on, however, I'm going to look at your methodology. I refuse to continue "accounting for" things in my worldview until you can show my why this proves your case that the Christian worldview is true (and that, by implication, the Christian God exists). Also, before I can accept your various "God did it" answers, I want some reason to believe that something as extraordinary as a God can even exist.
I don't think these are unreasonable requests. They are, no doubt, the same requests you would have for me if I started asking you to provide answers for big issues without explaining why they are relevant or if I started answering any question you had with "Shy, magic, invisible elves did it."
I appreciate the conversation, and I hope you enjoyed your camp.
hey - don't mind me i don't wanna stop this conversation but i just wanted 2 ask a question to exbeliever to get an intelligent answer
see i get that there are philosophical arguments for God n things... but for me... when i'm doubting Christianity n things the thing i have to ask myself is just
'okay then, what happened that first Easter morning?'
ppl like josh mcdowell have gone through all the diff possibilities... like the swoon theory, the wrong cave theory - and well you can't help but conclude that they're all ridiculous. for me... it turns out that the only historically plausible answer to how the Christian movement started is that Jesus was resurrected.
so yeh - i'm wonderin which theory you go with.
mmm
ttyl
emily...
(n i hope you guys try to keep a friendly tone haha )
Emily,
Because of time contraints, I'm going to just concentrate on one argument at a time. Right now, I'm dealing with Karen's presuppositionalist argument. I've actually started a post at my blog about this issue. It is "on hold," however, until I have more time.
In short, though, my "beef" is with the "historical" records themself (i.e. the gospels). I don't believe the basic "facts" presented in them because the authors were telling a story in a certain way to engender faith. They have a good reason to stretch the truth. The records were written many years after Jesus' death when the claims could not be disproven.
So, I have no idea what happened historically. My guess though is that something like this happened: Jesus died on a cross and was buried. A while later (anywhere from 40 days to 5 years), someone claimed to have a "vision" of Jesus or said they saw someone who looked like him. Others in the group, wanting to believe, started claiming visions as well. Pretty soon, myths started arising and the gospels took their shape. By the time the Christians made the claims about Jesus' resurrection, it was too late to do disprove them--i.e. his body had decomposed significantly.
Of course, I have no idea about the actual events. The problem is that our only records of this event are either biased records written for the purpose of converting people or very, very late records that simply repeat the myths of the bias records.
Check my blog within the next few weeks, though, and I'll respond in more detail. Until then, I'm going to concentrate on presuppositionalism.
(so far the tone is friendly, isn't it? I like how it's going)
' I don't believe the basic "facts" presented in them because the authors were telling a story in a certain way to engender faith. They have a good reason to stretch the truth. The records were written many years after Jesus' death when the claims could not be disproven.'
What is the good reason?
And why exactly couldn't the claims be disproven?
I mean i'm sure you've heard the dozens of arguments against this time old complaint... i mean little things in the gospels like the women being the first to see Jesus ressurected - that wouldn't have been the best thing to make up. i wun repeat the others - check out josh mcdowells or frank morrison's who moved the stone for this kinda thing...
I can understand if makin up these documents would have brought political power to the church - but it didn't... wasnt until the 4th century that they were official... many people suffered horrible deaths.... there was no powerful church that wanted to convert people, no reason for making up gospels that they would be hunted down and killed for.
and with this idea that one person had a vision of Jesus and then the others starting to believe - well i dno. see - the tomb was within a 15 min walk of the city. so many people would have been walking around there.
and i have another question. so u agree that he was buried in this tomb. What happened to the body? It just decomposed? Was the body removed day/years later by his disciples so that they could meet their horrible deaths by authorities?
If it wasn't removed - why didn't someone just point to the tomb and say here, Jesus was laid in Joseph of Arithmea's tomb ages ago.
'By the time the Christians made the claims about Jesus' resurrection, it was too late to do disprove them--i.e. his body had decomposed significantly.'
I dun get it - why would a decomposed body have hidden the truth that Jesus body was in this tomb?
mmm...
havin sum1 say days/5years later he's alive... they would be thoroughly discredited. They woulda been laughed at. People who knew Jesus would have still been walkin around. What about his family, his friends? Were they in on it? If so why - what could they possibly gain from such a blatant lie that could be disproven from... and if they weren't in on it they woulda discredited it.
but no... by 1st century all NT docuemnts written, by 100AD Paul's epistles were already being sent around as collections for people to read. no discredits from ppl who knew Jesus - only from the Jewish n Roman authorities i guess...
you realise that lots of people claimed to be a messiah, and one (i 4get his name) was crucified, n died, n his followers dispersed. It makes no sense that Jesus' disciples would have gone delusional, and told every1 sumthing that they would die for. Theodus (i think thats it), his disciples realised that he wasnt the King and so his followers and disciples naturally dispersed. Cruxifixion is an embarrasment. but Jesus disciples had motivation. It wasn't political.
i think ive reasoned out that there was no 'purpose of converting people' to Christianity if Jesus had not risen from the dead. there was no political power that could be seized.
'very late records that simply repeat the myths of the bias records.' - well, at one time or another, biased myths must have been started to be perpetrated, and around the time when Jesus' discples, friends, n family were still alive. They would have discredited it, and i don't think ther's any reason for them perpretrating it.
the non - christian sources talk about christians meeting and singing hymns. i don't see any evil conspiracy there...
See all of Jesus' friends - they didn't die for a conspiracy or even a religion - they died for Jesus the man.
i dno. i havent structured this very well.
but i understand ur critiscm of the historical nature of the gospels. I hope that maybe in this upcoming detailed response you can:
define for me if you believe that Jesus ever healed people or performed miracles,
maybe define what you believe about Jesus the man (from christian adn non-christian sources plz).
What do you believe happened to Saul/Paul the Pharisee? Is he a made up figure..?
I don't agree with ppl immediately dismissin the gospels as being biased mythological records. they've helped along archaelogical discoveries. the writers obviously didn't consider them to be myths, and neither did the readers. once again, people who were alive at the time of Jesus believed them to be the Word of God. ANd i don't believe it was so smart of these men to have 4 contrasting gospels written by people who didn't all work together if it was a conspiracy.
and i have more questions.. about what you believe the nature of the apostles to be...
you suggested that they had visions, wanting to believe - and that they were basically delusional.
But then you suggest that they were in on a conspiracy and their writings were for converting people, or were myths.
Well - with this delusional thing, why would they have deluded themselves consistently to the point of death? And why if they were proclaiming holiness and a freeing from sin and the law, would they have perpretated such lies for no personal gain...
realise i'm going on about this no personal gain thing, and that ppl might say we dont' know what they were getting out of it. But i think we do know what the majority were getting out of it - they were having to sell their goods to live with each other as a whole, they were being beaten and oppressed by authorities, they were travelling everywhere to set up churches insisting that they work and not be a burden upon people.
and if all these letters that Paul had written were made up - why wouldnt these places have just discredited these writings, saying that there was no healing, no speaking of different tongues, no nothing?
well im tying up this weird long not very well written thingo...
i understand if ur tooo bz with presuppositionalism.
But yeh, just keen to see if there is any atheistic concrete historically plausible answer for what might have happened.
thanks for responding in more detail soon.
thanks
emz.
emily,
Like I said, check back on my blog in a few weeks. I'm not going to deal with McDowell specifically (in the Christian apologetics world, referencing McDowell as an apologist is analogous to me (a liberal) referencing Michael Moore as an expert on 9/11; both have done a lot of work on the subject, but no one takes them seriously). I'm going to be dealing with William Lane Craig's argument for the resurrection (a serious apologist who wrote one of his doctoral dissertations on the resurrection and is widely respected as an expert on this issue).
If you are interested in an atheistic response to McDowell, see this for a chapter by chapter analysis of ETDAV. There is also an index of other critiques at the bottom of the page.
These atheists don't use the same arguments I would use, but if you are interested in a response, it's there.
*As an aside, I'm an old guy and your text-message style is hard for me to read (and as a high school teacher, it's kind of grating). If you choose to respond to my future post on this issue, can you do it with complete words and sentences?
One point that you raise and I might not address in my post is this:
Well - with this delusional thing, why would they have deluded themselves consistently to the point of death?
If conviction = truth, then you have to include thousands of cultists world-wide. For instance, all of the people in Heaven's Gate. They "deluded themselves consistently to the point of death," didn't they?
Anyway, let's wait until I post something on my blog and then we can discuss it.
Emily,
I put my resurrection post up here, if you are interested.
Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. Way too much here for me to read or offer anything helpful in response to.
However, just wanted to say hey, Karen, especially as you seem to know my best friend, Laura Brumley, and I thought that was a great coincidence--well, providence, but you know.
Also, just wanted to put in that seeking a conclusive argument for the existence of God does not necessarily fall outside of the presuppositional realm and that it's actually a matter of how you see the whole issue of the debate over the existence of God--is belief in him a presupposition, or a logical conclusion of a presupposition? Ultimately, one can have only one presupposition, or first principle, or axiom, and the only way to judge the axiom is from its logical outworkings; is the existence of God that ultimate presupposition, or do you believe it because of something else, and what is that something else?
I'd really, really love to talk with you more about this, let alone get better acquainted; if you email me at kilbsner@gmail.com I'll send you my private blog address if you like, and we could continue a conversation on presuppositionalism (which rocks) et al--also if you like.
Just so you know, I am going to respond, but this is the first day I've had at home in two weeks, so it may be a little bit longer before I can post.
Also, three weeks from today, I'm leaving home for about four and a half months, so we will probably have to bring ourselves to a stopping point before then.
Sorry for these delays!
I had to comment on this:
Second, humans and chimps share at least 95% of our DNA. It seems to me that we are very much like other animals. The primary difference I see is that we have bigger brains.
And remember: We share 90% with the mouse, and 50-60% with the banana.
Thanks, David, for supporting me on this one. I see that you, too, disagree with Karen's statement that humans "are different from any other organism in the universe." According to you, we're even pretty similar to mice and bananas. ;-)
Karen,
I just wanted to know if this conversation is over, or if I should expect another response in this thread.
There were a lot of things written in the dialogue, but I think it comes down to you expressing and defending an argument for the existence of your God.
In a comment of yours that I quoted above, you wrote, "We actually can prove that Christianity is the only philosophically defensible belief system."
In this discussion, I have asked you to do this. It seems you attempted to abandon traditional presuppositionalism and the transcendental argument for the existence of God. Instead, you formed a few new arguments that I believe you did not support. These arguments are at the heart of the issue while discussions of personality, morality, laws of logic, etc. are only pieces of these larger arguments.
One argument you present is this one:
Now, what criterion can we use to evaluate the worldviews in question, since deductive proof is not viable? I present the criterion of explanatory power. My position is that Christianity’s presuppositions can explain human observations and that no other worldview can. The choice is between Christianity and inconsistency.
You claim that "Christianity’s presuppositions can explain human observations and that no other worldview can." This is a very bold claim that needs to be supported.
You are offering several implicit arguments in your statement.
A Positive Argument
P1: Only one worldview, by its presuppositions, can explain human observations without contradiction.
P2: The worldview that, by its presuppositions, can explain human observations without contradiction is true.
P3: Christianity, by its presuppositions, can explain human observations without contradiction.
C: Therefore, Christianity is true.
A Negative Argument
P1: Either Christianity or another worldview alone can explain human observations, by its presuppositions.
P2: The worldview that, by its presuppositions, can explain human observations is true.
P3: No other worldview can explain human observations by its presuppositions.
C: Therefore, Christianity is true.
A Mixed Argument
P1: A worldview that can explain human observations is true.
P2: Christianity’s presuppositions [i.e. its worldview] can explain human observations and [] no other worldview can.
C: Therefore, Christianity is true.
You make further statements about these arguments. You say:
My contention is that Christianity is the only worldview with sufficient explanatory power, and thus, it is superior to all others. While there are many ways to demonstrate Christianity’s superior explanatory power, I am going to look specifically at metaphysics and ethics.
This argument is a little different than the ones above. Here, you only speak of "sufficient" explanatory power and "superiority," not truth. This argument might read:
P1: The worldview with sufficient explanatory power for human observations is superior to all others.
P2: The Christian worldview has sufficient explanatory power.
C: Therefore, The Christian worldview is superior to all others.
But, you actually weaken the argument with your subsequent statements so that it, more accurately, reads:
P1: If a worldview best explains all human observations, then it is true.
P2: The Christian worldview best explains metaphysics and ethics.
C: Therefore, the Christian worldview is true.
This would be, of course, a formally fallacious argument. You would have changed your terms. Formally, it would look like this.
x = a worldview
E = best explains all human observations
T = true
M = best explains metaphysics and ethics
c = the Christian worldview
(x)[Ex --> Tx]
Mc
.: Tc
[This reads, "For any worldview, if that worldview best explains all human observations, then that worldview is true. The Christian worldview best explains metaphysics and ethics, therefore, The Christian worldview is true."]
The obvious mistake is, of course, that you switch "best explains all human observations" to "best explains metaphysics and ethics." In order to make this argument work, you would have to change either the first premise or the second. For instance, you could either argue:
P1: For any worldview, if that worldview best explains all human observations, then that worldview is true.
P2: The Christian worldview best explains all human observations.
C: Therefore, that worldview is true.
Or,
P1: For any worldview, if that worldview best explains metaphysics and ethics, then that worldview is true.
P2: The Christian worldview best explains metaphysics and ethics.
C: Therefore, the Christian worldview is true.
You would still have to support these premises, though.
When you "contend" that "Christianity is the only worldview with sufficient explanatory power, and thus, it is superior to all others," you must also support this. You have agreed with this. In our first series of comments, you wrote, "The one who makes the claim has the burden to uphold it." You are making the claim, here, so you must support it.
But this claim seems a little too far-reaching to be supported. How are you going to prove that Christianity explains every human observation better than all other worldviews? That is a huge claim. To support it, you would have to demonstrate this by explaining every human observation, or at least the majority of them.
Secondly, as I mentioned above, you would have to show why your explanation "God did it" (in its various forms) is a "better" explanation than others. You would have to explain how reference to a non-corporal, triune being (something very far outside of our experience) is a better answer than any other.
The Metaphysical Challenge and The Ethical Challenge are not enough to support your claim. Even if you were able to demonstrate that Christianity better explained these two human observations (which I suggest you did not even come close to doing) better than another worldview, you have still failed to demonstrate (1) that Christianity can explain every other human observation better or (2) that no other worldview (not just naturalism/physicalism/materialism) can explain these two human observations better.
In short, you (and other presuppositionalists) are making bold claims that you cannot support.
For some reason, though, it seems that most presuppostionalists just don't get it.
Maybe this will help. What if I were to make an argument similarly rooted in unsupported, bold claims?
Consider this argument:
P1: Non-corporal beings cannot exist.
P2: The Christian God is a non-corporal being.
C: Therefore, the Christian God cannot exist.
This argument is technically valid (i.e. its conclusion follows from its premises). No Christian, however, would accept the first premise, and for good reason. My first premise is a bold claim that must be supported.
This argument (that I would never actually make) is my argument, but suppose that I said to you, "You must prove to me that non-corporal beings can exist." What I have done is made an argument, but then shifted the burden of proof to you.
This is exactly what you have done with your bold statements. You have said:
Looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge.
The long and short of it is that all other worldviews and belief systems except Christianity are contradictory.
My position is that Christianity’s presuppositions can explain human observations and that no other worldview can.
The choice is between Christianity and inconsistency.
My contention is that Christianity is the only worldview with sufficient explanatory power, and thus, it is superior to all others.
As Schaeffer wrote, “Christianity is not the best answer. It is the only answer.” It’s the only answer that is logically consistent and reasonable, meaning it’s consistent with human experience. The “glasses” of the Christian worldview are the only glasses that enable us to see the world clearly and truly.
These are all strong statements, statements that need strong support. Instead of supporting them, however, you have repeatedly ask that I support your statements by an inability to account for morality, personality, or logic.
To your credit, you did attempt to support your statements about explanatory power, but even if you had successfully demonstrated that Christianity better explained personality and ethics (which, I believe, you did not do--your answer was essentially "God did it"), you still would not have supported your strong statements.
You would see this more readily if I were using the same kind of fallacious arguments that you have presented. If, for instance, I attempted to support my claim that "Non-corporal beings cannot exist," by proving that beetles and kittens were corporal, you would rightly point out that that is not enough to say that no non-corporal beings can exist.
This, though, is exactly what you have done in your arguments. This is what every presuppositionalist that I am familiar with has done. They make bold claims and then try to shift the burden of proof.
You are the one who is making a claim, though, Karen. I have said that I do not hold the proposition "A god or gods exist" nor do I hold the proposition "No god or gods exist." You hold the proposition "The Christian God exists." You have made all of the claims listed above. You also said, "The one who makes the claim has the burden to uphold it."
Are you willing to support your claims?
Again, let me know if you have time to pursue this conversation or not. I understand if you don't. It sounds like you have a lot of exciting things going on right now. Maybe we'll have to carry this on once you have become a "professional apologist" in the future. ;-)
Thanks, David, for supporting me on this one. I see that you, too, disagree with Karen's statement that humans "are different from any other organism in the universe." According to you, we're even pretty similar to mice and bananas. ;-)
:D I know that was pun, but that stems from a misunderstanding of genetics. The amount of difference it takes in genes to make an entirely different thing is so minimal. But this is beside my point. The fact is, that genetically, we DO share genes with a banana and a mouse, and a monkey. But what the fact isn't is that gives proof for evolution. That in fact gives proof for an intelligent creator. Did you know that every book uses all the same letters, and almost all the same words, sometimes even the same phrases, sometimes we can tell a write by the way he writes. But do we then say, "Ah! Proof that this was originally one book."
There's so much more to an argument on genetics, that I can't do right now.
~Dave
Dave,
I'm glad you caught the humor.
The fact is, that genetically, we DO share genes with a banana and a mouse, and a monkey. But what the fact isn't is that gives proof for evolution.
If you'll notice, though, I'm not attempting to "prove evolution" in my comment. I only intended to counter Karen's statement that humans "are different from any other organism in the universe." I did this in two ways. I pointed out (1) that Karen has no way of knowing about every other organism in the universe, and (2) that humans are very much like other organisms even on earth.
The amount of difference it takes in genes to make an entirely different thing is so minimal.
If this is the kind of "difference" that Karen was talking about when she said that humans "are different from any other organism in the universe," then her statement is really meaningless. If she is only talking about genetic differences, then she could have said "bananas are different from any other organism in the universe," or "mice are different from any other organism in the universe," or "chimps are different from any other organism in the universe."
She still wouldn't be able to support these claims "universally," but if she only meant "genetically," then I would agree that humans are different than animals in this way and this would do nothing to advance her argument.
I was, of course, being ironic when I cited you as support. You, however, seem to think that I was trying to make a point about evolution when, in fact, I only sought to counter Karen's bold assertion. Your statement, unintentionally, also counters her assertion.
Again – I have to apologize for neglecting to respond sooner. This will have to be my last post, too. You can see my latest post for a full list of excuses. I really do regret having to cut this short, and I am sorry. I’m also sorry that this response is far from being as complete as I would like it to be.
OK – it would be help if we can narrow the focus a little bit. I do believe that Christianity is the only epistemologically sound worldview, but I didn’t make the argument in my last couple of posts for a couple of reasons. First, I thought arguing epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics at once would be too much material to tackle at one time. Second, for me, the epistemological argument is the hardest to clearly express. I can summarize it, but I’m still working toward a place where I understand it clearly enough to be able to argue it extensively.
It’s clear that you really want to refute the epistemological argument, but the fact is, I’m just not making it right now, so it has no bearing on our discussion. Yes, I have written about it in the past, and yes, I really do like it. I can certainly see why you might want to defend your worldview against it. Still, it’s extraneous right now. To the best of my knowledge, I haven’t made (or implied) an epistemological argument in our discussion.
Based on the introduction to your last comment, I feel a bit like you’re telling me that because I’m a Christian I’m inherently unable to be objective. If you honestly believed that, there would be little point in your discussing with me, unless you just wanted to make me look silly. I sincerely hope that is not the case, yet you when you write things like, “That is apologetics. Taking each item from the big picture and attempt[ing] to explain it away,” and “their [Christians’] unwavering commitment to the topic they are debating causes them to overlook and reinterpret evidence to the contrary,” your statements come across as ad hominem attacks.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but I thought our whole debate was about our presuppositions and how we interpret evidence. You and I both have worldviews that determine the way we interpret facts. My worldview is Christian, and yours is not. It’s true that we’re debating Christianity, but it’s just as true that we’re also debating the merits of your worldview – as I’ve tried to make clear from the beginning, “our present discussion must be one that compares two worldviews.” If this is the case, then the fact that I am a Christian does not disqualify me from this discussion, any more than the fact that you are an atheist disqualifies you.
I’ll address methodology before metaphysics and ethics. This, unfortunately, is only the barest of skeleton responses. You’re criticizing “God” as an explanation for existence, etc because you say it’s like invoking “shy, invisible, magical elves” as an explanation for everything, but it seems like the only similarity between God and these elves is invisibility. It’s far better to you the analogy (a very tired one) of wind. God, like wind, is invisible, but we see its effects.
For me to say “God did it” without explaining exactly how is perfectly reasonable, as long as I can provide a philosophical justification, which is the subject of our entire discussion. We’re not talking specific processes; we’re talking general philosophical principles. Were I to ask you how, specifically, evolution works, you couldn’t give me an explanation, either. No scientist has demonstrated macroevolution. Your big criticism of my methodology seems to be that God exists (if he exists) independently of your experience and that thus, you have no reason to accept the possibility that he can exist. In making this criticism, you’re holding my worldview to unreasonable standards. You cannot observe the process of evolution (microevolution, yes; macroevolution, no), which means it exists outside of your experience, yet you admit that it seems very reasonable to you.
God’s being outside your sense experience is no reason to reject his existence; so are many advanced physics principles, as well. As they say, “Truth is stranger than fiction.” The idea of God being “strange” to you is not a reason to reject him.
Moving to the “impossibility of the contrary” argument. My contention is that Christianity is the only worldview that meets the criterion of explanatory power. You don’t think I can ever demonstrate this. It’s true that there are thousands of worldview variations, but no matter how many worldviews there are, they all have to come back to one of the four fundamental options I outlined in my original post. That’s how I propose to meet my own criterion. If I’m rehashing something you’ve already addressed, I am truly sorry, but I didn’t catch your response to this.
Another methodological issue is how we are formulating our arguments. You keep trying to cast what I write into the mold of deductive proof, while I’ve stated that I am not offering deductive proofs. Instead, I’m arguing in the context of explanatory power, also called inference to the best explanation. This is not the same thing as a deductive proof. Stephen C. Meyer of Whitworth College describes this method of support in this way in his article, “The Return of the God Hypothesis”:
“In this method of reasoning, the explanatory or predictive virtues of a potential hypothesis determine which among a competing set of explanations constitutes the best. Scientists infer that hypothesis among a competing group which would, if true, provide the best explanation of some set of relevant data. True, both an earthquake and a bomb could explain the destruction of a building, nut only the bomb can explain the presence of charring and shrapnel at the scene of the rubble. Earthquakes do not produce shrapnel nor cause charring, at least not on their own.”
It’s important to me that we uphold this distinction in this discussion.
Hopefully that takes care of the methodology portion of the discussion. That leaves metaphysics and ethics.
My claim is that only personality can create personality and that consequently, only a personal beginning can account for the “mannishness of man.” You seemed pretty frustrated with this argument, and I’m beginning to think I assumed too much when I made it. Coming from a Christian perspective, I assumed you believe man is a personal being (in a way that distinguishes him from animals) and that you are not a determinist. Maybe I was wrong, but based on what I’ve read on your other blog, that was the impression I got. I find it extremely hard to believe that you are both a determinist and a believer in (some sort of) ethics. Determinism leads to the Marquis de Sade’s famous quote, “What is, is right.”
Under metaphysics, you main argument was two-fold. First, you claimed that we see the impersonal creating the personal all the time. In support, you sighted examples of individuals’ personalities being altered by impersonal forces, namely brain tumors. Interesting as these are, they aren’t examples of the impersonal creating the personal – only of the impersonal influencing the personal. There’s a huge difference there, and you can’t make the jump from influencing to creating without radically different support.
Second, you claimed that there really isn’t any support at all for my statement that only an infinite-personal God can create personality. Again, I’m sorry for the confusion; it would have been better if I had stated this argument more completely.
In his book In the Beginning Was Information, Werner Gitt writes the following:
“There is no known natural law through which matter can give rise to information, neither is any physical process or material phenomenon known that can do this…A code system is always the result of a mental process (it requires an intelligent origin or inventor)…it should be emphasized that matter as such is unable to generate any code. All experiences indicate that a thinking being voluntarily exercising his own free will, cognition, and creativity, is required.”
In this context, the argument has to do with the origin of life, rather than personality, but in both instances, the point is remarkably similar. Gitt is explaining that as far as human experience can tell, only information can generate more information. Matter is not capable of accomplishing this. Matter may influence information that is already present (as it did in your examples), but that is not the same thing. Now, if matter cannot generate information (and thus cannot generate life), it clearly cannot generate personality, either.
Also, I think you are right in criticizing my phrase “creating personality.” That was not well chosen on my part. I apologize. It’s more correct to say that whenever we observe art, or some other structure, tool, etc, being created, a greater being/animal/person always creates something lesser. Human experience leads us toward the conclusion that the greater creates the lesser, rather than the other way around.
Finally, ethics. First, if you are an evolutionist, I don’t understand how you can make the jump from “is” to “ought.” Natural selection deals with what is practical, with what is necessary to survival, with what yields certain results, but it never deals with ethics or morals. As C.S. Lewis wrote, "You can shuffle 'I want' and 'I am forced' and 'I shall be well advised' and 'I dare not' as long as you please without getting out of them the slightest hint of 'ought' and 'ought not'."
You’re also claiming that an arbitrary moral standard can be objective. Maybe it can be objective to you, but there’s no reason, outside of your own opinion or desire, that it should be objective at all. It may or may not be objective, but it most certainly is arbitrary. You fashion a moral standard out of thin air, but should anyone else obey it? There’s no reason, unless you’re going to force people, in which case the only reason is compulsion.
But this so-called “morality” is far removed from the traditional idea. This morality is an idea in your mind that may or may not be shared with others. There’s no reason it should be universally binding, it has no greater source than the mind of man, and it’s built on a philosophy that can’t account for the shift from “is” to” “ought.” You may want the world to be a certain way, and you may say that it should be a certain way, but should is equal to your personal opinion, to what you want. There’s no overarching reason for other people to accept it. There’s no more universal right and wrong, only arbitrary right and wrong.
You can call this morality if you like, but it’s not the same morality I writing about. They’re totally different concepts. You’ve denied that my kind of morality needs to exist. You’ve also asked me to provide support for its existence. I really wish I could give you a full and fair response, but all I can do right now is refer you to the opening chapters of C.S. Lewis’ Mere Christianity, which I’m sure you’ve read. As for moral diversity, the Christian doctrine of man’s fall explains it very well.
Despite the risk of sounding like a broken record, I’ll say again that I wish we could actually finish this. It’d be great for me to be able to research more and be really engrossed in this conversation, but I don’t have the freedom to do that. Prior commitments and responsibilities are calling. Thank you for this discussion. I’ve appreciated it.
Hmmm. . . not quite what I was hoping for, but I understand that you have other obligations.
Since you didn't respond to my comments in any detail, I'll be brief as well.
You said:
Looking at Christianity, we see that it is the only belief system that gives us a basis for knowledge.
The long and short of it is that all other worldviews and belief systems except Christianity are contradictory.
My position is that Christianity’s presuppositions can explain human observations and that no other worldview can.
The choice is between Christianity and inconsistency.
My contention is that Christianity is the only worldview with sufficient explanatory power, and thus, it is superior to all others.
As Schaeffer wrote, “Christianity is not the best answer. It is the only answer.” It’s the only answer that is logically consistent and reasonable, meaning it’s consistent with human experience. The “glasses” of the Christian worldview are the only glasses that enable us to see the world clearly and truly.
My contention is that Christianity is the only worldview that meets the criterion of explanatory power.
My claim is that only personality can create personality and that consequently, only a personal beginning can account for the “mannishness of man.”
You said:
The one who makes the claim has the burden to uphold it.
You said:
. . . I am a presuppositionalist, and I do argue like one.
Unfortunately, this appears to be true. Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, and all the other presuppositionalists I have read also make bold claims and offer no support for them.
Good luck with your future endeavors.
I appreciate your time.
Have you ever heard of a splendid Latin ditty by the name of petitio principii? Your argument seems to have.
By claiming that the ethics that we have inherited from our Judeo-Christian culture are the sole standard by which to judge any worldview, you've unfortunately rigged your thought experiment. This is called "begging the question." This fouls up your ethical response (you have said, more or less, if A, then A - if we accept the culturally conditioned responses laid upon us by a Christian-influenced society, then we will reject a belief system which allegedly runs against the grain of a Christian-influenced morality).
As to your metaphysical argument, which is naturally less important (ethics>metaphysics), you demonize determinism to the detriment of your philosophy, by making it appear as though people ought to be afraid of determinism and naturalism. This rests upon the unstated (perhaps unstatable) fear that we have something to lose from determinism, that if we regard ourselves solely as part of the natural world (the only belief of naturalism), we will become slaves to or prisoners within our bodies. I can't persuade you to take a different stance, as you quite clearly laid out early on in your remarks, it's quite impossible to 'convert' someone to a diametrically opposed viewpoint (monism v Bowdlerized psychophysical dualism, materialism v spiritualism, determinism v free will, relativism v absolutism, reason v faith, etc.).
That being said, the essay is quite precocious for a 17-year-old.
I don't have a problem with my Christianity. I don't believe in the Big Bang Theory nor the Theory of Evolution because my faith is completely entrenched in what the bible says. I don't need proof of the existence of God because all I have to do is to look around me and see how wonderful our universe is, how marvelous our bodies are, and how great His creations.
This is in response to the recent comment left by one Betsy, who says "I don't need proof of the existence of God because all I have to do is to look around me and see how wonderful our universe is, how marvelous our bodies are, and how great His creations."
My first objection to this statement is that it is fundamentally intradependent. It effectively says that she believes that God exists because he exists (the reference to "His creations"). In other words, the statement assumes the existence of God as a means of proving the existence of God. This has no logical basis.
If you were to remove that last clause, we would still be left with the following arguments:
A: The Bible is absolute, literal, infallible truth.
B: The Bible says that God exists.
C: God exists.
We can already see the problem with this - it presupposes the veracity of the Bible's claim that God exists. As this presupposition is not agreed upon by all parties involved in this discussion, it is not an acceptable postulate, therefore invalidating the argument. If you could logically support the veracity of each and every claim made by the Bible, that would be another story. In the meantime, let's just say that it's a really, really old book, and that convincing people of its miraculous truthfulness is not an easy task. Faith is a beautiful thing, but it is not logical. As a fellow Christian, I would point out that a bona fide miracle, a divine touch, would serve as a basis for faith. However, in order to convince others that this faith is grounded in truth, one would have to prove the miracle.
Your claim that the Big Bang and evolution are both directly refuted by the Bible is, by the way, also false. The language of Genesis is not specific enough to merit this statement. Six days is all well and good, but who says that the days were twenty-four hours? For that matter, who says that the twenty-four hours (if, indeed, they were of that number) were our hours? This is God we're talking about; it's not like he plays by the rules.
The other argument (that God exists because the universe is wonderful) also doesn't really work, because the Christian God is not the only explanation for a wonderful universe. For one thing, there are plenty of other deities throughout history who have been credited (or blamed) for the creation of the universe. You are conveniently ruling these out. Besides, this argument doesn't account for human misery. Remember, this isn't paradise, and even an optimist cannot deny the existence suffering. There are two explanations for this being tossed back and forth. One is that it used to be paradise (Eden), but is now no longer so because we screwed it up. The other is that it was never paradise, and life is "meh" because nobody ever said it had to be paradise. Occam's razor definitely favors the latter. I suppose you could also say that God made it as it is, but that isn't really consistent with what we know of the character of God.
The glory of creation and the veracity of the Bible are both fine concepts theologically, but neither serves as a logical basis for the proposal that God exists. Besides, a faith "completely entrenched in what the Bible says" is practically exclusive of the presence of a living God. "Jesus loves me, this I know,/for the Bible tells me so" does not function as a basis for faith. "Jesus reached out and touched me" does.
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